International Law Studies—Volume 14
International Law Topics and Discussions
U.S. Naval War College (Editor)

The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S.
Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.

S"GB.:\IARINE .:\IIXES.

The I-Iague Convention ""VIII, 1907, relative to the
laying of nuto1natic contact sub1narine 1nines 'vas adInittecl to be tentative. In vie"~ of this fact should this
convention be revised?
(a) Should the use of subnutrine tnines be absolutely
prohibited?
(b) If sub1narine 1nines arc not prohibited, should unanchored auton1atic contact sub1narine 1nines be prohibited?
(c) Should there be a regulation· as to the area 'vithin
'vhich 1nines 1nay be placed?
(d) "\"\~hat precautions should be taken in laying
anchored and unanchored con tact 1nines ?
(e) Should a neutral State be forbidden to laY nunes
"~ithin its territorial "·aters?
~
(f) Should article 6 be rene,ved?
(g) Should the use of torpedoes be further regulated?
CONCLUSION.

(a) The usc of sub1narine 1nines should not be abso-

lutely prohibited.
(b) The use of unanchored auto1nntic contact 1nines
should be prohibited or 1nore definitely restrictcd. 1
(c) The area 'vithin "·hich 1nines 1nay be placed should
be deter1nined by regulation.
(d) "\"\~hen anchored auto1natic contact 1nincs nre enlployed, every possible precaution n1ust be taken for the
security of peaceful shipping, including!. An advance notice to foreign Governn1.ents and to
mariners, specifying the general Ji1ni ts of the 1nined area.
1 Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and introducing the proposed
changes, the following form may he su~gestecl as meeting present requirements and
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanehored automatic contaet mines except when they
are so constmcted as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have
lost control over them, and in every case before rassing outside the area of belligerent
activities.
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2. Provision for \Varning peaceful vessels approaching
the n1ined area.
3. Specification of the time during 'vhich the mines
'vill be dangerous.
(e) The laying of 1nines hy a neutral State should not
be prohibited.
(j) Article 6 of Convention \'III should not be continued in force.
(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but
should be less regula ted if any change is made in the
convention.
~OTES.

Jllines in the Russo-Japanese ll' ar, 1904-5. - The use
of sub1narine 1nines in the Russo-Japanese \Yar of
1904-5 particularly attracted the attention of the 'vorld
to dangers of the use of these instru1nen ts of \Var.
~fines had been used before this ti1ne, but not in such a
general1nanner. ''rhether or not 1nines \Vere deliberately
allo,ved to drift out to sea, it seems probable that a large
number of 1nines did dritt about in the \Vaters in the
neighborhood of Port Arthur. The reports seen1 to show
that many 1nines \Vere found outside the imn1ediate area
of the belligerent activities. As the danger fron1 drifting
contact n1ines n1ight be equally great to the party placing
the mines, it is di-fficult to believe that mines ,vhich \vould
not become har1nless after a fixed time \vould be set
adrift in an area of general operations, even if there \vere
no regulation against the use of submarine mines.
The destruction of the Japanese battleship llatsuse on
~fay 15, 1904, \Vas reported by Ad1niral Togo, as follo,vs:
"\Vhile the fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the Hatsuse
struck an enemy's mine. Her rudder was damaged, and she sent a
message for a ship to tow her. One was being sent. when another
message brought the lamentable report that the Hatsuse had struck
another mine and had sunk immediately after. She was then 10
knots off the Liau-tie-Shan promontory. There was no enemy iii
sight, and her loss must have been caused by a mine or submarine.

Later it \Vas declared that the Ilatsuse \Vas sunk by a
submarine 1nine. The destruction of the Ilatsuse by a
mine at a point 10 miles fro1n Port Arthur caused much
discussion. It \Vas admitted that belligerents had a right
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to carry on \\'fir on the high sen, but it \\'as also contended that neutrals had a right to safe passage on the
high sen \\'hen not \\·ithin the nren of nctunl active
hostilities. It "·as contended that if a neutral vessel
had passed over the san1e spot it \\·ould hn ve been destroyed as \\·as the Ilatsuse. Later, in 1907, the Chinese
delegate at the Conference nt The I-I ague explained
that 1nnny Chinese vessels had been destroyed by
1nines drifting about the sen, son1e eYen entering the
littoral sea. The Chinese delegate reckoned the nu1nber
of Chinese "·ho had lost their lives as 500 to 600.
It \\·as reported that the Russian vessel 1.,. rnissPi,
after lnying 389 1nines, w·as itself destroyed by the
390th. The Russian vessel Petropavlovsl~ seen1s to have
been destroyed by a n1ine "·hen near Port Arthur. It is
of course i1npossible to deter1uine "·hether these vessels
\\·ere ·destroyed by n1ines laid by Russian or by Japanese
forces.
During the Russo-J apnnese \·r ar the area in "·hich 1nine
laying \\'"as carried on w·as re1note fron1 the usual routes
of conunerce. The possible effects of contact 1nines
drifting about the English Channel as in the neighborhood of Port Arthur \\'"US pictured effectively by son1e
\\Titers, and attention 'vas called to the dangers fro1n such
forn1s of \\'"nrfnre and the necessity of regulation of
the use of sub1nnrine 1nines beca1ne evident.
Propositions at The Ilague in 1907.-The British delegation at the Hague conference in 1907, follo,ving its
instructions, offered the follo,ving proposition, 'vhich
became the basis of 1nuch discussion:
ARTICLE

1. L'emploi de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact

non mouillees est interclit.
ART. 2. Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact, qui, en
quittant leur point de mouillage, ne deviennent pas inoffensives, sont
pro hi bees.
ART. 3. L'emploi des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact
pour etablir ou maintenir un blocus de commerce est interdit.
ART. 4. Les belligerants ne pourront se servir de n1ines sous-marines
automatiques de contact que dans leurs eaux territoriales ou celles de
leurs ennemis. Toutefois, devant les ports de guerre fortifies cette
zone pourra etre ctendue jusqu'a une distance de dix milles des canons
a terre, a charge, pour le belligerant qui poserait ces mines, d'en donner
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avis aux neutres, et de prendre en outre les dispositions que les circonstances lui permettront pour eviter, dans la mesure possible, que
les navires de commerce qui n'auraient pu etre touches par cet avis
soient exposes a etre detruits.
Seuls les ports possedant au moins un grand bassin a radoub et qui
seront munis d' outillage necessaire a la construction et la reparation
de vaisseaux de guerre et dans lesquels un personnel d'ou\Tiers payes
par l'Etat pour effectuer Ia construction et Ia reparation de vaisseaux
de guerre est entretenu en temps de paix, seront consideres comme
entrant dans la categorie de ports de guerre.
ART. 5. D'une fa~on generale, les precautions necessaires seront
prises pour sauvegarder les navires neutres qui se li\Tent a un commerce
licite; et il est a desirer que, en raison des dispositions memes prises
dans la construction des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact,
ces engins cessent d'etre dangereux au bout d'un delai convenable.
ART. 6. A la fin de la guerre les belligerants se communiqueront
mutuellement dans ]a mesure possible les informations necessaires
quanta !'emplacement des mines automatiques de contact que chacun
aura posees le long des cotes de l'autre, et chaque belligerant devra
proceder dans le plus bref delai a l'enlevement des mines qui se trouvent
dans ces eaux territoriales. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de
la Paix, Tome III, p. 660.)

Italy proposed to limit the life of unanchored automatic
contact submarine n1ines to one hour after they were
launched and to per1nit the use of such anchored contact
mines only as should become harmless on breaking adrift.
Japan 'vould limit the use of unanchored mines to the
immediate sphere of hostilities and make the life by
construction such as to offer no danger to neutrals.
The X etherlands delegation introduced certain amendments looking particularly to the use of mines for purposes of defense by neutrals.
Brazil offered an amendment of somewhat similar
purport.
Spain p,lso made a proposition to limit the mines to
terri to rial 'va ters.
Gern1any suggested the addition of the follo,ving
clause:
La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur
le theatre de la guerre; sera considere comme theatre de la guerre
l'espace de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de
guerre ou sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite
de la presence ou de !'approche des forces armees des deux helligerants.
(Ibid, p. 663.)
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The United States delegation offered an a1nenchnent
as follo,vs:
1. Unanchored automatic contact mines are prohibited.

2. Anchored automatic conta.ct mines, which do not become innocuous on getting adrift, are prohibited.
3. If anchored automatic contact mines are used within belligerant
jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activitie~, due
precautions shall be taken for the safety of neutrals. (Ibid., p. 664.)

Russia added the provision in regard to torpedoes and
approved form of n1ines:
l. Les belligerants se serYiront de n1ines automatiques de contact
sons-marines amarrees construites de fa<;on a ce que, en tant que cela
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront rompu
leurs amarres.
2. LeuT mines flottantes automatiques seront construites de fa<;on a
ce que, en tant que cela est possible, elles deviennent inoffen~ives
apres un certain delai apres leur lancement.
3. Les torpilles seront construites de fa<;on a ce que, en tant que cela
est possible, elles deviennent inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque
leur but.
4. Un delai suffisant sera accorde aux Gouvernements pour mettre
en usage les appareils de mines perfectionnes. (Ibid., p. 664.)

A synaptical arrange1nent of all the propositions 'vas
made and then various a1nendments 'vere suggested to
the ne'v arrangement.
Several suggestions "'"ere 1nade with vie,v to allowing
mines 'vithin the area of immedi~te belligerent operations
or ,vith view. to making a definite limit from the coast
for the e1nployment of mines. Ten miles "\vas frequently
suggested.
The propositions in general sho'v a drift from the idea
entertained by 1nany at the commencement of the discussion, ,vhich idea 'vas favorable to absolute prohibition
of the use of mines.
l\1. I-Iagerup, the presiding officer of the subcom1nittee,
summarized the propositions before the committee in the
follo,ving manner:
Les que:;;tions dont nous aurons a nous occuper sont les suivantes:
Premiere question.-Certaines especes de mines ne doivent-elles pas
etre !'objet d'une interdiction absolue, qu'elles soient placees dan:: des
eaux territoriales ou en pleine mer?
·
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La proposition britannique interdit:
(a) Les mines sous-marines automatiques de contact non amarn3es;
les amendernents italiens et japonais (annexes 10 et 11) font exception
pour l~s mines qui deviennent inoffensives un certain temps apres leur
immersion. L'amendement italien fixe ce temps a une heure, tandis
que l'amendement japonais n'indique pas de fixation.
(b) Sont en outre interdites, d'apres la proposition britannique, les
mines qui en quittant leur point de mouillage ne deviennent pas
inoffensives. La meme interdiction est, dans d'autres termes, contenue dans l'amendement italien et l'amendement espagnol. (Annexes
lO et 14.) La difference entre ce dernier amendement et les dispositifs sus-mentionnes est que l'amendement espagnol presuppose
une espece d'autorisation internat~onale pour le placement de mines
automatiques de contact.
Seconde question.-Le placement de mines sons-marines ne doit-il
pas etre interdit en pleine mer?
La proposition anglaise, article 4, n~pund affirmativement, sous cette
reserve qu'elle autorise la pose de mines en mer jusqu'a dix milles
devant certains ports de guerre. La proposition contient en outre une
definition de ce qu'on entend par port de guerre. L'amendement de
Ia Delegation des Pays-Bas propose de supprimer cette definition.
Troisi'eme question.-Dans quelles conditions les Etats peuvent-ils
placer des mines dans leurs eaux territoriales?
Cette question n'est traitee par la proposition britannique qu'en
tant qu'elle concerne les bclligerants, tandis que ]es amendements,
proposes par les Delegations des P3.ys-Bas et du Bresil, visent aussi
les neutres. La proposition britannique dans ses articles 4-G prescrit
d'une fa90n generale des precautions a prendre pour sauvegarder la
navigadon pacifique contre les dangers des tnines. Sur ce point, il y
a cette difference entre la proposition britannique et l'amendement
neerlandais que la premiere demande aux belligerants de donner aux
neutres un avis special du placement des mines, tandis que l'amendement neerlandais se contente d'une publication genera.le. La proposition de la Delegation de Pays-Bas qui traite egalement des neutres
contient d 'ailleurs les memes prescriptions pour le placement des mines
par les neutres et par les belligerants. II est en outre a remarquer que
cette proposition soumet tout placement de mines, soit par les belligerants, soit par les neutres, a la restriction que les detroits qui unissent
deux mers libres ne peuvent pas etre barn~s. Pour le reste des dispositions proposees par les differentes d8legations, il convient d'envisager
separement les differentes hypotheses su.ivantes:
(a) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans ses propres eaux
territoriales.
·
(b) Placement de mines par un belligerant dans les eaux de l'adversaire. L'amenclement espagnol (annexe 14) le soun1et :\ la condition
que le belli?e~ant y exerce un pouvoir effectif. La proposition britanniqua (article 3) prescrit de son cote que l'emploi de mines pour etabl.ir ou Inaintenir un hlocus est interdit.
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(c) Placmnent de a1ines dans les eaux territoriales des neutres.
L'amendement IH~erlandais assimile ce cas completement au placement de 1nines par les belligerants, tandis que l'anwndement bresil.ien
(annexe 13) IJe parait admettre pour les neutres que le placement de
n1ines explosant sous l'action d 'une impulsion provoquee en connaissance de cause par des autorites d'Etat. C'et amendement contient du reste des prescriptions speciales quant a l'avertissenlent a
faire et la responsabilite pour le deplacement des 1nines.
La quatriEnne question est ce1le Yisee par l'article 7 de I 'an1endement
neerlandais (annexe 12). Y a-t-il lieu d'etablir par une convention
internationale des regles pour l'indemnite en cas de dommage cause par
les 1nines? (Ibid., p. 522.)

Preamble of the I-Iague con'vention.-The prea1nble of the
Hague convention relative to the laying of auto1nat.ic
contact sub1narine 1nines sho\\~s that those \\~ho dre\\~ the
convention did not regard its rn·ovisions as anything
more than tentative. The for1n of the pre~unble is distinctly favorable to 1nuch 1nore rigid regulations than
those en1bodied in the conYention itself. The prean1ble
states that the po\Yers:
Inspired by the principle of the freedon1 of sea routes, the common
highway of all nations; seeing that, although in the existing state of
affairs it is impossible to forbid the en1ployment of automatic contaet
submarine mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate
their employment in order to Initigate the severity of war and to ensure,
as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is
entitled, despite the existence of war; until such time as it is found
possible to formulate rules on the subject which shall ensure to the
interests involved all the guaranties desirable; have resolved to conclude a convention for this purpose, and have appointed the following
as their plenipotentiaries.

Tentative character of the con1.:ention .-Xot only does the
preamble of the convention itself and n1any of the discussions sho\\~ that the convention relative to the lnying of
automatic contact sub1narine mines is tentative in character, but some of the reserves made by States and the
declaration of Great Britain sho"~ this. (Deuxie1ne Conference Internationale de la Paix, ton1e 1, p~1ge 281.)
Types of mines.-<Jfines are generally clnssified as anchored nnd unanchored or free. ....-\..nchored 1nines vary in
construction and operation, but usually are such as are
under control so that they may be discharged at the \vill
of an operator on shore, or such ns explode on contact
\Yith a vessel or other hard body. Unanchored 1nincs also
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vary in construction and operation. Som~ have a rcasana bly defini tc limit of cffecti Yi ty, aft~r 'Yhich they sink
or otherwise become har1nlcss. Son1<.~ unanchored mines
seem to be effcctiYc for long periods.
Controlled anchored 1nines.-N aturally there has been
little objection to the use of controlled anchored mines.
An anchored mine "~hich can only be discharged at the
"~ill of an operator n1ay differ little fro1n a shell from a
gun. The shell may be ai1ned to strike the Ycsse l, 'Yhile
the n1ine may be placed so that it "'"ill be struck by a
vessel, but "~in explode only "'"hen the operator in charge
determines and at other times "~ill be har1nless. Such
mines do not necessarily in1pcril neutrnl or innocent shipping. .A. s these n1ines arc under control of the opera tor,
it is generally held that the State placing such mines is
responsible for their use. The use of such mines has not
met 'vith much opposition, but has been generally approved.
Anchored contact rnine8.-..A. nchored contact 1nincs being such as explode on contact "'"ith a vessel, 1nay be dangerous to any vessel, 'Yhcthcr lhc vessel be hostile, neutral, or of the nationality placing the mines. From the
time "'"hen these 1nines arc placed, the force placing them
has no control over them except the negative control due
to the kno"~ledge of their supposed location. Currents
may change according to circun1stances the location of the
mines. The storn1s and tides of so1ne regions make it
difficult to maintain the position of 1nines. These mines
also sometimes drift from their moorings. In storm, fog,
or stress of "\veather such mines 1nay be particularly dangerous, because the usual precautionary measures n1ay
be impossible, and vessels 1nay enter a n1inc field inadvertently. \ifhen once adrift, a contact mine 1nay remain a menace to shipping unless so constructed as to becon1c harmless on breaking adrift.
It is open to question 'Yhether anchored contact mines
are not so dangerous as to involve undue risk to all parties 'vho use the sea.
There is a general agreement upon the requirement
that anchored contact mines should become harmless
on getting adrift.
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British instructions, 1907.-Th(\ delegates of Great
Britain 'vere acting in accordance 'vith their instructions
in advocating the entire abolition of the use of automatic
contact mines. These instruet.ions 'vere as follo,vs:
His ~Iajesty's GoYernment wo1.1ld viPw with ~atisfaction the abandonnlent of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare
altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition. they
earnestly hope that the employment of these engines of war will only
be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would adyocate
an arrangement by which the u~e of automatic mines should be limited
to territorial waters, and, if possible. to such portions of territorial
"~aters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus employed
should be effectively anchored. and so constructed that. in the eYent
of their breaking adrift, they would c·ither automatically become harmless or sink, and that in any case their actiY(' life should not exceed a
limited period of, say, six n1onths. (Correspondence Respecting the
Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers )lise. Xo. 1 (1908)
(Cd., 3857).)

Discussion at The Hague. 1907.-1"he discussion of the
subject of submarine mines at The Hague in 1907 sho,ved
that the conference considered it too early to give any
definite pronounce1nent upon the matter. The report of
the committee frankly achnits this. The votes in the
subcon1mittees 'vere so1netin1es quite evenly divided.
Several States n1aintained that the use of n1ines should
not be prohibited not 1nerely because mines 'vould be
needed in time of 'var. but also because they "rou1d be
used to protect neutrality. The Brazilian delegate
supported this position.
The Netherlands delegate objected to the British proposal on the ground that it lacked any provision relating
to the laying of mines during a 'var by neutral po,vers
in their territorial 'vaters in order to maintain their neutrality. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Pai..x,
Tome III, p. 521.) Other States ordinarily neutral also
supported the proposition to allo'v the use of submarine
m1nes.
The general argument 'vas that belligerents 'vere not
yet prepared to renounce the use of a means of offensive
and defensive 'varfare 'vhich 'vas regarded as formidable
and at the same time less costly than many other 1neans.
'fhe States 'vith smaller navies 'vere particularly averse
to the prohibition of mines. The general sentiment 'vas
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favorable to regulation but not to prohibition of the use
of mines. Germany 1naintained a position less favorable
to regulation than most States. Great Britain led the
movement for restriction. At the time of the adoption
of the convention relating to mines Sir Ernest Satow
made a formal statement on behalf of the British delegation, of "rhich a translation appeared in the London
Times of October, 1907:
Having voted for the mines convention which the conference has
just accepted, the British delegation desires to declare that it can not
regard this arrangement as furnishing a final solution of the question,
but only as marking a stage in international legislation on the subject.
It does not consider that adequate account has been taken in the convention of the rights of neutrals to protection or of hu~anitarian sentiments which can not be neglected. The British delegation has done
its best to bring the conference to share its views, but its efforts in this
direction have remained without result. The high seas, gentlemen,
form a great international highway. If in the present. state of international laws and customs belligerents are permitted to fight out their
quarrels upon the high seas, it is none the less incumbent upon them
to do nothing which might, long after their departure from a particular
place, render this highway dangerous for neutrals who are equally
entitled to use it. \Ve declare without hesitation that the right of the
neutral to security of navigation on the high seas ought to come before
the transitory right of the belligerent to employ these seas as the scene
of the operations of war.
Nevertheless, the convention as adopted imposes upon the belligerent no restriction as to the placing of anchored mines: which consequently may be laid wherever the belligerent chooses, in his own
waters for self-defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of attack,
or finally on the high seas, so that neutral navigation will inevitably
run great risks in time of naval war and may be exposed to many a
disaster. \Ve have already on several occasions insisted upon the
danger of a situation of this kind. \Ve have endeavored to show what
would be the effect produced by the loss of a great liner belonging to a
neutral power. \Ve did not fail to bring forward every argument in
favor of limiting the field of action for these mines, while we called
very special attention to the advantages which the civilized world
would gain from this restriction, since it would be equivalent to diminishing to a certain extent the causes of warlike conflicts. It appeared
to us that by acceptance of the proposal made by us at the beginning
of the discussion dangers would have been obviated which in every
maritime war of the future will threaten to disturb friendly relations
between neutrals and belligerents. But since the conference has not
shared our views it remains for us to decl~re in the most formal manner
that these dangers exist, and that the certainty that they will make
themselves felt in the future is due to the incomplete character of the
present convention.
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As this convention , in our opinion , constitutes only a partial and
inadequate solution of the problem, it can not, as has already been
pointed out, be regarded as a complete exposition of international law
on this subject. Accordingly, it will not be permissible to presume the
legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this convention has not
prohibited it. This is a principle wh_ich we desired to affirm, and which
it will be impossible for any State to ignore, whatever its power. (See
Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 281.)

'rhere also appeared in the Times a translation of the
declaration of Baron nfarschall YOll Bieberstein, of the
Gern1an delegation, made in11nedia tely after the English
s ta temen t, as f ollo\vs :
That a belligerent who lays mines assun1es a very heavy responsibility toward neutrals and toward peaceful shipping is a point on which
we are all agreed. No one ''ill resort to this instrument of warfare
unless for rnilitary reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But
military acts are not solely governed by stipulations of int9rnational
law. There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense
of duty imposed by principles of humanity wiU be the surest guides for
the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most effective guaranty
against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it
(je le dis a haute voix), will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the
duties which en1anate from the unwritten law of humanity and civilization. I have no need to tell you that I entirely recognize the importance of the codification of rules to be followed in war. But it would
be a great n1istake to issue rules the strict obsen·ation of which might
be rendered impossible by the law of facts. It is of the first hnportance
that the international rnaritime law which we desire to create should
only contain clauses the execution of which is possible from a military
point of view-is possible even in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the respect for law would be lessened and its authority undermined. It would also seem to us to be preferable to maintain at present
a certain reserve, in the expectation that seven years hence it will be
easier to find a solution which will be acceptable to the \Vhole \Vorld.
As to the humanitarian sentiments of which the British delegate has
spoken, I can not admit that there is any country in the world which
is superior to rny country or my Government in the sentiment of
humanity. (Ibid.)

"Tith such diversity of opinion among large States the
prohibition of mines is not immediately possible.
'fhe action of States since the Hague Conference of
1907 has sho\vn that mines \Vere not to be immediately
set aside as engines of \Var. Opinion and usage, therefore, seern at present unfavorable to the entire prohibition of the use of submarine mines.
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Opinion of Dupuis.-After speaking of the discussion
at The Hague in 1907, Prof. Charles Dupuis, "Titing in
1911, says:
II semble que ces constatations devTaient suffire pour faire condamner,
meme en dehors de tout accord conventionnel, l'usage d'enging aussi
dangereux pour la navigation pacifique que pour les vaisseaux de
guerre belligerants. Parce que la haute 1ner n'est soumise a aucune
souverainete, il est loisible aux belligerants de s'y battre; il est admis
que les batiments neutres qui se risquent sur le theatre des operations
le font a leurs risques et perils; ces batiments pourraient se tenir a
l'ecart ou fuir a }'approche des navires de combat; s'ils ne le font pas,
ils s'exposent sciemment a un danger qu'ils pourraient eviter; ils ne
peuvent se plaindre des effets de leur propre imprudence. ::\Iais si, de
ce que lamer n'est a personne, il resulte que les belligerants ont liberte
de s'y battre, il resulte aussi que les neutres, que les pacifiques ont
liberte de s'y n1ouvoir et droit d'user de cette liberte sans courir des
perils qu'ils ne peuvent ni prevoir, ni eviter. II est possible de prevoir et d'eviter le theatre d'un con1bat; il est impossible de prevoir et
d'eviter les mines invisibles qui fl.ottent a la derive, a des distances
incalculables des operations de guerre, et qui conservent leur puissance
de destruction pendant des mois et des annees apres le jour ou elles
ont ete immergees. II est done inadmissible que les belligerants
menacent et detruisent la liberte de la mer, en semant des engins
aveugles et inevitables, qui portent au loin, pour un temps illi1nite,
contre tousles navires, les perils qu'ils n'ont le droit de susciter que
contre leurs seuls ennen1is.
On pourrait, sans cloute, adn1ettre que les eaux territoriales des
belligerants fussent, pendant la guerre, rendues inaccessibles par de3
mines, a la condition que les neutres, prevenus du danger, a'ient la
faculte de s'y soustraire, Inais encore fauclrait-il que les mines immergees dans les eaux territoriales fussent mises dans l'impossibilite d'aller,
en pleine mer, repandre le peril qu'elles ne doivent creer que dans la
zone soumise a la juridiction des Etats riverains. (Le Droit de la
Guerre :Maritime, No. 332, p. 547 .)

A.s a general principle, mines may be used 'vhen under
control or '\Tithin an area under the exclusive control of
the belligerent "-ithin "-hich peaceful shipping may not
enter. Therefore, mines may be used w-ithin the area of
and during actual belligerent action, as peaceful shipping
is excluded from this area or enters it at the risk of injury.
Oonclusion.-The use of submarine mines should not be
absolutely prohibited.
Unanchored mines.-The Russo-Japanese War of
1904-5 caused many complaints upon the use of n1ines.
The Chinese contended that their nationals had been
sacrificed by the careless use of 1nines by the bellig-
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crents . It \Vas tnaintaincd that the sea~ had been
strc"'n w·ith floating 1nincs. ''Thether there \\'as any
justification for this supposition 1nay be doubted and the
injury to innocent vessels Inay have been caused altogether by 1nincs 'vhic h had broken adrift from their
moorings. If this \\'as the case, these mines 'verc evidently not so constructed as to beco1ne harmless "'hen
getting free of their 1noorings, for they became in effect
floating contact 1nincs 'vhich " 'ere carried by the c·urrcnts
in n1any directions.
The 1nine being in any case a particularly dangerous
engine because hidden, beco1nes even Inore dangerous
" ?hen floating freely, the kno\\'ledge of its location being
unkno,vn and its effective life .indcfinite in duration. The
unrestrained usc of ~nanchorecl mines is therefore generally conde1nncd as securing to the belligerent no advantage
conunensuratc "·ith the risk involved.
The question then arises as to the use of unanchored
contact 1nines for special purposes. A vessel Inay be
pur:3ucd by another. It 1nay fire a shell or discharge a
torpedo at the pursuing vessel. 11ay it not then drop a
n1inc in the path of the pursuer 1 Evidently the principle is nearly the san1c as to the different 1neasures so far
~s concerns the t"·o belligerents. The shell 'vill if it
1nisscs its 1nark sink to the botto1n of the sea and 1nay
becon1e i1n1nediately har1nlcss. The torpedo 'vill also
usually becon1c harn1less 'vhen it has completed its relative! v- short run. The essential difference in the mine is
that unless specially constructed it may rc1nain a danger
to any vessel for an indefinite period. 'J:'he K a val ,,~ ar
College in 1905 therefore proposed the follo,ving:
Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except tho"e that by construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before
passing outside the area of itnmediate belliegrent operations. (International Law Topics~ 1905, p. 147 .)

The Hague Conference of 1907 adopted a son1e,vhat
different for1nula, 1naking the tin1e of effectivity definite,
saying it is _forbiddento lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so
constructed as to become harml~s one hour at most after the person who
laid them ceases to control them.
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It n1ay be observed that this fixing of one hour as the
time of active life of an unanchored automatic contact
mine 1nay permit the 1nine to pass entirely outside the
area of immediate operations. If the operations should be
in or near an ocean high,vay of commerce, the period of
one hour as the life of an unanchored mine might be long
enough to place 1nany neutral vessels in danger. The
belligerent vessel 'vhich had thro,vn over the 1nine at the
beginning of the hour might be many miles distant before
the end of the hour, and if a vessel or fleet 'vere pursuing
the same might be true of the pursuers.
From the drafting of the present rule also there is no
reason "rhy unanchored auto1natic contact mines n1ight not
be used even "\vhen the object 1night not be to escape pursuit, but to endanger an enemy "Tho 'vas expected later to
pass through the area. The only restriction is that the
mine shall become harn1less after one hour at most, other"rise there is no formallitnitation, even the requiren1ent
(art. 3) that" every possible precaution must be taken for
the security of peaceful shipping" is applied specifically
to "anchored automatic contact n1ines." The Hague
regulation in regard to unanchored mines is Inanifestly
unsatisfactory, and if unanchored mines are not altogether
prohibited this clause should be revised.
Attitude of United State~ at The !!ague, 1907 .-The
United States at The Hague in 1907 proposed the prohibition of unanchored n1ines. The course of discussion
is showrn in the report of the conunittee:
Pourtant, la proposition d'une interdiction absolue de toute mine
automatique de contact non amarree fut reprise par la Delegation des
Etats-Unis d' Amerique (annexe 17). Ellene put rallier la majorite des
voix dans le comite d'examen, qui la rejeta par 11 voix contre 4 et 2
abstentions et se prononc;a ensuite unanimement en faveur de la limitation, dans le sens sus-indique, du temps pendant lequella mine non
amaree serait dangereuse. ~lais, bien que d'accord sur ce dernier
principe, les membres du comite n'etaient pas unanimes a vouloir aussi
fixer d'une maniere determinee le laps de temps dans lequelles n1ines
non-amarrees devraient devenir inoffensives. On a soutenu qu'il y a
des cas ou une limitation fixee d'avance est impossible; on devrait se
contenter d'une formule plus generale qui statuerait, sans fixer un laps
de temps "que les mines automatiques de contact non amarrees doivent
devenir inoffensives a pres un temps limite de maniere a n'offrir aucun
danger aux navires neutres." "Si une force navale," a dit le Contre713Q6-Hi--8*
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Amiral Siegel, " se voit poursuivie et veut lancer des mines non amarn3es pour empecher son adversaire de l'atteindre, une limite determince, avant tout la limite d'une heure, rendrait l'emploi de cette
anne tres souvent inefficace et inutile, 6tant donne que celui qui poursuit sera en mesure, soit par ses eclaireurs, soit par d'autres moyens,
de connaltre que son adversau·e a jete des mines; ce dernier trouverait
done des moyens pour eviter tout danger, SOit en faisant un petit detour,
soit en attendant une heure avant de passer sur le lieu dangereux, apres
quoi il sera en toute securite. Un autre cas se presente, si un ennemi
bloque !'embouchure d'un fleuve. Si le defenseur vent employer des
mines flottant~s contre son ennemi en les envoyant en aval, le temps de
leur efficacite doit etre en rapport avec la longueur du chemin a parcourir et ne peut pas etre fixe d'avance."
Malgrc ces considerations, la n1ajorite du comite, desirant assurer
une efficacite reelle au principe adopte, se pronon9a en faveur d'une
limite de temps fixee d'avance (9 voix contre 2 et 5 abstentions), apres
quoi le comitc, appele a choisu· entre la limite d'une heure et celle de
deux heures (la derniere proposee a titre transactionnel parS. Exc. ~I.
de Hammarskjold) se pronon9a en faveur de la limite d'une heure, ala
majorite de 8 voix, contre 1 et 7 abstentions.'.' (Deuxieme Conference
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 403.)

Precautions as to unanchored 'inines .-If 1nines are to
be used they are evidently engines of such nature as
should be used \\'"ith son1e care that they do no injury to
parties not concerned in the \\'"ar .
. A..11 innocent private vessel of the enen1y 1nay not be
sunk unless under "exceptional necessity," and those on
board n1ust be placed in safety before the destruction of
the vessel, though \vhen such a vessel deliberately con1es
\vithin range in time of actual battle, it must take the
consequences. The existence of an actual battle is a
fact evident to the vessel.
Thi::, condition is some\vhat parallel to that of a floating unanchored 1nine thro\\'"n over by one belligerent vessel \Vhile another is pursuing. It y,'"ould see1n that to
make the situation n1ore nearly parallel the range of the
n1ine should be that of a shell or of a torpedo or the actual
limit of in1n1ecliate operations. .1\..t the present ti1ne it is
probable that the guns of any ship of \\'"ar have not a range
greater than the distance \\'"hich could be n1ade by a fast
vessel in one-half hour. One hour \Vould therefore seem
a long life to allo\v to unanchored contact mines, because
if not exploded they 1night continue for a half hour to
be a danger to innocent shipping \vhich 1night presu1ne
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the sea to be safe after the pursued and pursuer had
passed. If a long life is allo,ved to unanchored mines
there is the correspondingly increased risk that these
mines may drift .in unexpected directions and to a greater
distance from the point of launching. If allo\ved a life of
one hour the vessel n1ay be before the end of the hour
beyond the distance \vithin \vhich an approaching neutral
or other innocent vessel can he notified of ·the danger
fron1 the mine.
The use of uncontrolled, unanchored contact n1ines
should be prohibited. The reasons for prohibiting unanchored, uncontrolled mines are Inany. Among the
reasons \vould be the extretne danger to all "Tho follo\V
the sea as compared "Tith the slight chance that the
enemy against \vhom the 1nine is launched \vill be injured.
These mines should be clearly distinguished from the
controlled, unanchored contact mines, the range of action
of \Vhich is determined by the belligerent \Vho launched
the n1ine.
A belligerent at the present time has no right to complain of the use of 1nines against his vessels of \\rar. It is
true that the 1nine is a hidden 1neans of attack, but the
submarine boat n1ay also be a hidden means of attack,
and there is no prohibition of the use of hidden or secret
measures provided no perfidy is involved. The innocent
vessels of the enen1y are generally exempt from attack
though they may be taken as prize. Small coast fishing
vessels and small boats engaged in local trade are, \vhen
innocently employed, by convention, exen1pt fron1 capture even. The obligation of the belligerent to guard
such vessels against injury from mines w'ould therefore
be as imperative as to guard them against injury from
cannon fire. The only \vay in \vhich this can be done is
by control of the life of the mine.
As a life of one hour seems an unduly long titne for an
uncontrolled, unanchored n1ine and involves undue risks,
it \vould see1n best to further limit the maximum time,
and as in 1nany cases the maximum tin1e should not be
granted, there should be another basis for cleter1nination
of the life depending upon the area of in11nedia te hostilities. A co1nbina tion of these \vould seen1 to give the
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necess~ry

nnd reasonable guaranty for safety of innocent
\esse ls, particularly '"hen an cngagen1cn t 1nigh t take
plnce in tho neighborhood of the high,vays of 1naritiine
conunerce, as 1nay be the case. The proposition of the
Naval \Vnr College in 1905 w·as that-

Unanchcr~d, contact mines arc prohibited except those that by
construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certajnly
before passing outside the area of in1me<li.ate belligerent activities.

The I-I ague convention of 1907 provided that it is forbiddento lay unanchored automatic contact mines. except when they are so
constructed as to become harmless 11ne hour at most after those who
laid them haYe lost control nf. them.

It may be advantageous to combine these propositions,
as the single limit of time proposed at The I-Iague does
not seem to be sufficient. The \~V ar College proposition
of 1905 contained a reference to time "\vhich "\vas not made
specific. There "\vould probably be a little objection to
making the time limit specific provided it "\vere not too
long. One hour seems too long. One-half hour seems
ample from a belligerent point of view, and from the neutral point of view the shorter the time the more satisfactory, because the risk "\Vould be correspondingly
lessened.
Gonclusion.-The use of unanchored automatic contact
mines should be prohibited or more definitely restricted.
Using the phraseology of the Hague convention and introducing the proposed changes, the follo,ving form may be
suggested as meeting present requirements and opinions:
It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact
mines except "\vhen they are so constructed as to become
harmless one-half hour after those "\vho laid them have
lost control over them, and in every case before passing
outside the area of belligerent activities.
General statement as to area.-It is generally admitted
that one belligerent must at all times when outside of
neutral jurisdiction be on guard against attack "\vhich
may legitimately be made by the other belligerent.
This attack may be made upon the high sea8 or "\vithin
belligerent "\Vaters. The attack may be sudden under
cover of night, of fog, or of ruse not involving perfidy.
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When a neutral vessel enters the area of actual legitimate hostilities the vessel enters at its o'vn risk. If the
opposing belligerents are engaged in firing upon each other
a neutral vessel comes 'vithin range at its peril. Certain
areas in the neighborhood of fortifications or other points
of military importance are sometimes set apart as strategic areas and vessels are notified or 'varned not to enter.
Such action has been generally approved. Blockaded
areas are universally recognized as closed to free communication. Blockaded and strategic areas are examples of areas from which the innocent vessel is 'varned by
public proclamation or notification. The liability of the
neutral is based upon his action 'vhen kno,vledge of conditions based on proclamation or notification may be
presumed. In case of an actual battle, knowledge is presumed because of the evident facts. It is proper that a
neutral should bear the consequences of disregard of
knowledge which he reasonably may be presumed to have.
The risk from mines is or may be such as can not be
presumed to be kno,vn to the innocent vessel. In case
of bombardment the commander of the attacking force
is under obligation to do his utmost to 'varn the authorities. Other provisions are in the direction of safeguarding not only neutrals but also noncombatants. ~1any
regulations are aimed to safeguard those not engaged in
warfare from hidden dangers.
The right of innocent use of the high sea has long been
recognized as paramount to any right of a belligerent to
exclude innocent vessels from a given area, except for
immediate military reasons. Even a blockade to be
binding 1nust be effective. It is, of course, possible that
a battle n1ay be 'vaged in any part of the high sea; this
contingency does not, ho,vever, give a belligerent the
right to exclude innocent shipping fron1 any area in
'vhich he is not actually operating or maintaining a force.
A belligerent has the right to place 1nines in certain
areas for military purposes. These military purposes
are supposed to be immediate and not remote or con-·
tingent. The propriety of placing of .mines for the
defense of a n1ilitary port is 'videly adn1itted, though
there is difference of opinion upon the distance from the
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port at 'vhich n1ines 1nay be laid. The laying of mines
in the high sea is not adn1itted by aU to be allowable,
but all cleinancl proper precautions for innocent parties.
The discussion as to n1ines in the high-sea areas sho,vs
less accord in reference to unanchored contact n1ines than
in reference to anchored mines.
Speaking of the n1ines in the seas of the Far East,
during the· Russo -Japanese "rar ('vhether they might
haYe been anchored and have broken loose, or 'vhether
they n1ight haYe been unanchored, the results 'vould
haYe been the sa1ne), Prof. Westlake said:
~ow, the right of a State in the wat ers subj ~ct to its sovereignty can
certainly not rank higlv::.r than that of a private owner in the land or
water which is his property. Still less. if possible. can the right of a
State in the open sea, which is free to the use of all. rank higher than
that cf prope1ty. But no principle is 1nore firmly established in the
sclence of bw th::>..n that ''h~ch s:1ys to an O\nler sic utere tuo ut alienum
non bedas. The right of s0vereignty, therefore, does not extend to
emp1oying anywhere "hat may be foreseen to be engines of slaughter
and damage to unoffending foreigners. The foreign government whose
subjects suffer from such engines does not need to inquire whether their
_use is prohibited by any positive rule of .international law, whether
r~sting on recogn:.zed custmn or an agree1nent. They are indefensible
in themselves. and the fore~gn govern1nent concerned will be justified
not only in taking up the cause of its injured suhject~. It will not have
exceeded its rights if it interferes in orde1 to stop the offending methods
of war. (International Law, Part II, \Var. p. 322.)

The contention of Prof. Westlake that the right of
sovereignty does not extend to unregulated employ1nent
of mines is so generally supported at the present tin1e as
to scarcely need discussion. It may therefore be stated
in a general 'vay that mines may not be used except
within certain defined areas. What these areas shall be
is, ho,vever, a question upon w·hich there still exists
differences of opinion.
Propositions as to area, The Hague, 1907.-The British
proposition at the Second Hague Conference, 1907, in
article 4 limited the use of automatic contact subn1arine
mines to the territorial 'vaters of the belligerents and to an
area extending 10 1niles from fortified places or military
ports.
The X etherlands delegation 'vould also prevent the
mining of straits 'vhich unite open seas. (Deuxieme
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 661.)
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The Spanish delegation 'vished to limit the placing of
mines by one belligerent in the territorial 'vaters of the
other belligerent· to the area over 'Yhich the belligerent
placing the mines 'vas in effective control.
-Germany added an important suggestion:
La pose des mines automatiques de contact sera aussi permise sur 1e
theatre de laguerre; sera considere comme theatre de laguerre l'espace
de mer sur lequel se fait ou vient de se faire une operation de guerre ou
sur lequel une pareille operation pourra avoir lieu par suite de la
presence ou de !'approche des forces armees des deux belligerants
(Ibid., p. 663.)

Later a somewhat modified suggestion 'vas made by
the German delegation:
La pose des mines automatiques de contact amarrees sera aussi
permise dans !'emplacement de l'activite immediate des belligerants,
pourvu que les precautions soient prises pour la surete a laquelle les
neutres ont droit. (Ibid., p. 668.)

A somewhat similar amendment was offered by the
Netherlands delegation.
The various propositions were put in definite form as
basis for consideration by the comite d'examen, as follo,vs:
ARTICLE 2. Il est interdit de placer des n1ines automatiques de
contact amarrees de la d'une distance de trois milles marins a partir de
la laisse de basse mer, ou le long de toute l'etendue des cotes, ainsi que
des lies et des banes qui en dependent.
Pour les baies, le rayon de trois milles marins sera mesure a partir
d'une ligne droite, tiree en travers de la baie dans la partie la plus
rapprochee de l'entree au premier point ou l'ouverture n' excedera pas
dix milles.
ART. 3. Devant les ports de guerre, la limite pour le placement des
mines est portee a une distance de dix milles marins.
Sont consideres comme ports de guerre les ports, qui sont decretes
comme tels par l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent et ceux oil existent des
chantiers navals de construction.
ART. 4. Dans les limites indiquees aux deux articles precedents, lea
belligerants ont le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact
amarrees dans les eaux de leurs adversaires.
Toutefois il est interdit d'y placer des mines automatiques de contact
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de cominerce.
ART. 5. Dans la sphere de leur activite immediate, les belligerants
ont de meme le droit de placer des mines automatiques de contact en
dehors des limites fixees par les articles 2-4 du present reglement.

120

SUBl\IARINE l\IINES.

Les mines employees en _dehors des limites fixees par les article 2-4
doivent etre construites de fa~on qu'elles soient rendues inoffensives
dans un delai maximum de deux heures apres que le poseur les a
abandonnees.
ART. 6 (reserve). La communication entre deux mers libres ne peut
etre barree entierement par des mines automatiques de contact. l\fais
le passage pourra y etre soumis a des conditions qui seront decretees par
les autorites competentes.
La disposition de l'alinea 1er ne porte aucune atteinte aux regles
etablies par les traites et conYentions existants, ni aux droits de la
souverainete territoriale. (Ibid., p. 671.)

With tho exception of n.rticle 6 above the projet
presented to the third committee closely resembled that
before the comite d'examen.
Later the Colombian delegation proposed to make
certain changes and to introduce as article 2L'emploi des mines automatiques de contact amarrees est absolument
interdit excepte comme moyen de defense.
Les belligerantes ne pourront se servir desdites mines que pour la
protection de leurs propres cotes et seulement jusqu'a la distance de la
portee maxime des canons.
Dans le cas des bras de mer ou des passages maritimes navigables
conduisant exclusivement aux cotes d'une seule Puissance, cette
Puissance pourra barrer leur entree, pour sa protection, en pla~ant des
mines automatiques de contact amarrees.
Il est absolument interdit aux belligerants de placer des mines
automatiques de contact amarrees en pleine mer ou dans les eaux de
l'ennemi. (Ibid., p. 680.)

Circumstances determining use of mines .-Some consideration must be given to the purposes for which mines are
used. "\Vhile there are those who \vould prohibit the use
of minos altogether, these do not seem to be in the
majority at the present tin1o. Admitting that mines will
for a ti1ne continue to be used, their use may be limited
30 that circumstances \voulcl condition the legality.
Mines may be prohibited except for purposes of defense.
There ahvays arises in such a case a difference of opinion
upon \Vhat constitutes defense, and it is not ahvays
possible to determine \vhother mines in a given region
are placed for defense or offense. This difference of
opinion appeared at the conference at The IIague in
1907. 1fany States in favor of limiting the use of mines
could not be convinced that this method of restriction
\vould realize that end. The Colombian propc'sition that
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the use of anchored automatic contact mines should be
~tbsolutely prohibited except for purposes of defense \vas
voted upon, receiving 16 affirmative and 15 negative
votes, while 6 abstained from voting and 7 'vere absent.
As this did not give an cybsolute ·majority, further consideration of this proposition 'vas abandoned. (Ibid.,
Tome I, p. 292.)
Another proposition was made by the Nether lands
delegation looking to special regulation of the use of
mines in straits. This also did not receive sufficient
support to make it a part of the proposed convention.
Use of mines for intercepting commerce.- It was ~efi
nitely proposed at the Hague Conference to prohibit the
use of mines for intercepting commerce. This proposi·
tion was not sufficiently supported, and the question came
upon the form of restriction. The British delegation
proposed to allo'v mines only before such ports as are
considered "military ports."
The second draft of the report of the committee was as
follows:
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and port1::
of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.

The German delegate declared that he reserved his
vote upon this form, as it introduced a subjective element in the determination of the character of the act
which in application 'vould give rise to difficulties.
The British delegate remarked that the British proposition was advanced 'vith the idea of avoiding the German
objection. When the second draft was put to vote, 33
voted yes, 3 abstained, 7 'vere absent, and Germany
reserved its vote, and the convention provided that
mines for "the sole object of intercepting com1nerical
shipping" were prohibited.
The recognized method ·of intercepting commerce 'vith
n. belligerent is by blockade. The penalty for attempting
to violate blockade may be condemnation of ship and
cargo, but there is no penalty imposed upon the cre,v, as
would be the case if mines were used to destroy the ship.
Naval lVar College discussion, 1913.- The conclusions
drawn from the discussions at the Naval v'Tar College
in 1913 'vere in accord 'vith the general opinion of naval
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men and of ,,.T iters. This opinion sho,vs a tendency
to,vard n1ore definite restriction upon the use of mines,
both as regards character of the mines and as regards
area 'vithin 'vhich they may be placed. 'rhe subject
"\Vas, ho,vever, considered only as one part of the general
topic of means of injuring the enemy. The conclusion
as to torpedoes and mines "\Vas as foUo,vs:
Torpedoes and mines:
(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not become harmless
when they have completed their run.
(b) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except within the
immediate area of belligerent operations.
(c) It is forbidden in the htgh seas and in marginal waters of the
belligerent (1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines except when
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after
those 'vho laid them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored
automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they
have broken loose from their moorings.
(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the coast or before the
ports of the enemy except for strictly military or naYal purpoEes.
It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to maintain a
commercial blockade.
(e) 'Vhen mines· are employed, every possible precaution must be
taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and should they
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as
military exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must also
be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.
(f) At the close of the war the belligerent States undertake to do their
utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each State removing
its own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the beiligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the
other party by the State which laid them, and each State must proceed
with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.
The belligerent States upon which the obligation to remove the
mines falls after the end of the war should as soon as possible give notice
that the m~nes have so far as possible been removed. (International
Law Topics and Discu~sions, 1913, p. 147 .)

Institute o.f International Law, 1910-1913.--The Naval
War College, International La'v Topics, 1913, pages 143146, sho'v that "\Vith slight modification in regard to the
provision for removal of the mines after the "\Var the rules
6f the Institute, approved in 1910, "\Vere approved in 1913.

HAGUE DISCUSSION ON AREA .

123

These rules of the Institute follo'v closely the Hague
convention relative to the laying of automatic contact
submarine mines except as to the area. The Institute
rule provides:
It is forbidden to lay in the open sea automatic contact mines, whether
or not anchored.

At earlier sessions there had been proposed the following:
It is forbidden to lay fixed or floating mines in the oren sea.

The main point upon 'vhich emphasis may be placed
is the prohibition of mines in the open sea in distinction
from marginal waters, and the report of 1910 shows that
it was the intention of the Institute that this prohibition
should be absolute. (23 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit
International, pp. 179, 429.)
Discussion as to area, The Hague, 1907.-'fhe qu<?stion
as to limitation of area within 'vhirh mines might be laid
received much discussion and the proposi tio~1s of the
con1ite d'exan1en in respect to limitation of area were
much reduced.
Admiral Siegel, speaking for the German delegation,
assumed a hypo-thetical case to illustrate the ground of
opposition to certain restrictions:
Aussi, la Delegation allemande doit-elle faire des reserves sur les
articles dont les dispositions peuvent causer des malentendus et qui
d'autre part interdiraient l'emploi des mines en beaucoup des cas,
ou cet emploi est indispensable. II sera cite un seul exemple. Si
une flotte X bloque la cote d'un pays Y, elle le fait pour lui couper
toute communication par mer. Elle veut faire mourir le pays d'une
lente inanition en le privant de ses moyens d'existence. Le pays
y fera tout son possible pour eviter un pareil sort et cherchera a tenir
les navires de la flotte X a une distance aussi grande que possible de
ses rivages. Dans le cas ou les forces maritimes ne suffisent pas a
atteindre ce but, l'Etat Y trouve dans les mines un auxiliaire precieux. Mais pour les mettre en activite, il faut les porter dans la
proximite de l'ennemi. Or, la flotte X ne s'arretera pas toujours pres
de la cote, elle stationnera peut-etre a une distance de 20 milles ou
plus. Comme !'article 3 interdit l'emploi des mines a une distance
au-dela de 3 mllles, et en quelques cas de 10 milles de la cote, le defenseur se verrait prive du seul moyen qui put forcer la flotte ennemie a
s'eloigner de ces cotes. Cet etat de choses serait absolurnent inadmissible. Mais ce n'est pas tout. L'article 5 interdit toutes les mines qui
ne deviennent pas inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles ont ete
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abandonnees par celui qui les a posces. Si done, dans le cas mentionne, le defenseur y a pose des mines devant ses navires dans !'esperance de pouvoir rester sur place pendant uncertain temps, et s'il est
attaque par la ftotte X beaucoup plus forte que lui et qui !'oblige a se
retirer precipitamment, comment serait-il en mesure de trouver les
moyens pour garantir que les mines qu'il a posees deviennent inoffensives dans les deux heures? Il est evident que c'est impossible, cet
exemple qui teste parfaitement dans le cadre de ce qui pent arriver
dans chaque guerre demontre jusqu'a !'evidence que les dispositions
des articles 3 et 5 sont inacceptables au point de vue militaire. I1
convient en outre de faire observer que dans le cas qui vient d'etre
cite on ne saurait dire que les interets de la navigation pacifique soient
en jeu. Entre nne cote bloquee et la ftotte bloquante aucune navigation de commerce ne pent exister. Pourquoi alors ces restrictions inacceptables? (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de ]a Paix, Tome
III, p. 378.)

Sir Erne.st Sato,\~, of the British delegation, set forth
the reasons "·hy the general public should be deeply
interested in the regulation of the usc of subn1arin.c 1nines
and .the dangers of any considcra b le freedon1 in the use
of 1nir:.cs. In or..e part of the so1nc,vha t extended discussion t:'ir Err.cs t P a to'v renu1rks:
N ous SOillilles d'avis que la pose de mines amarrees en dehors des
eaux tercitoriales des belligerants et au-dela d'une limite de dix milles
marins devant les ports de guerre, arsenaux militaires, ou etablissements de constructions navales ou de radoub, doit etre interdite aux
belligecants. Le droit qu'accorde le projet de poser des mines amarrees
en pleine mer dans I a ''sphere d'activite immediate donne aux belligerants la faculte de semer ces engins dans toutes les mers pen profondes. Ainsi elles pourraient etre posees dans une grande partie de
I a Baltique, dans la :Jier du Nord, la :Jianche, sur les cotes de la :Jiediterranee, pour ne pas parler du Detroit de l\Ialacca, des parages des
Indes N eerlandaises, du Golfe du Tonkin et de la :Jier J anne. Il est
vrai qu'il est stipule au 2e alinea de l'a1ticle 5 que les mines amarrees en pleine mer devront etre construites de fa~on a devenir inoffensives dans un delai 1naximum de deux heures apres qu'elles auront
ete abandonnees par le billigerant poseur, mais comment cette stipulation pourra-t-elle etre mise a execution? Sauf dans le cas de la mine
electro-mecanique, la mine nne fois posee ne pent etre rendue inoffensive que par l'action d'une contre mine qui, elle, agit instantanement.
Nons ne croyons pas que l'on puisse inventer nne mine qui devienne
inoffensive deux heures apres que le belligerant poseur aura quitte les
lieux, peut-etre a la hate pour echapper a la pourJuite de l'ennemi;
la stipulation nons paralt done demander !'impossible et il nons paL·ait
preferable de supprimer !'article 5 en entier ce qui aura pour resultat
de faire disparaitre aussi l'alinea 2 de !'article 9.
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L'article 4, alinea 3, declare qu'il "est interdit de placer des mines
automatiques de contact devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire
dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce." C'est Ia
une clause qui laisse au belligerant une echappatoire bien dangereuse.
On avait propose dans le comite de ne permettre la pose de mines
devant un port de commerce qu'a la condition qu'il y eut dans ce port
au moins une grande unite de combat, mais la proposition fut vivement
combattue et dut, par consequent, etre retiree. Cependant il serait,
a notre avis, tout a fait contraire a I' esprit eta la lettre de la Declaration
de Paris de permettre qu'un blocus flit maintenu, totalement ou en
partie, a l'aide de mines. J e me permets de vous rappeler le texte
meme du passage qui a trait a cette question: "Les blocus, pour etre
obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force
suffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi."
Il est clair qu'il s'agit ici d'une force suffisante composee de navires de
guerre, et que l'on ne peut comprendre dans cette categorie des mines
sons-marines qui ne sont sujettes a aucun contrOle et qui ne contiennent en elles aucune preuve evidente de !'intention de fermer acces
du port bloque. Il serait par consequent bon de tirer ce point au clair
afin de ne laisser subsister aucun equivoque, et c'est pourquoi nous
avons l'honneur de proposer le texte suivant a la place de celui que
nous avons sous les yeux:
"Il est interdit de poser des mines automatiques de contact devant
les ports de l'adversaire autres que ceux qui sont consideres comme
ports de guerre." (Ibid., p. 380.)

Gen. Porter: of the American delegation, speaking on
the proposed convention, says of the clu.uses particularly
relating to area in \Yhich 1nines may be placed:
Il est evident que la determination de la limite de trois milles serait
souvent extremement difficile sur une cote bordee d'lles et de banes
partiellement ou totale1nent submerges, et qui peut-etre ne seraient
meme pas releves; mais !'objection capitale a cet article est que la
portee des canons de vaisseaux de guerre modernes etant de 15,000
yards, la distance de trois milles ou 6,000 yards est moindre que la
moitie de leur portee; ainsi des vaisseaux pourraien t a ttaq uer les cotes
avec impunite malgre la defense au moyen de mines.
Il est vrai que la superficie de la pose des mines a ete etendue par
un vote du comite a la "sphere d'activite immediate," et tel est le
but du l er alinea de I' article 5, mais le 2e alinea de cet article stipule
que les mines ainsi placees en dehors de la limite de trois milles
deviendront inoffensives deux heures apres qu'elles auront ete abandonnees. Il est clair que ceci est impossible, etantdonne qu'une mine
aussi intelligel!te n'a jamais ete imaginee. Si le navire faisant la
patrouille du champ des mines est force de rentrer par suite de !'approche de l'ennemi toute communication physique avec les mines est
necessairement rompue, et l'ennemi se fiant ala bonne foi eta l'habilete technique avec lesquelles les stipulations d'une convention ont
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etc executees par l'auYersaire peut prendre Une base de tir commode
aprcs que deux heures se sont ecoulees, et proceder :\ la destruction
de routes, ponts, viaducs, tunnels, docks et autres etablissements de
manufactures et de constructions de navires qui se trouvent en de9a
de .trois 1nilles de ln laisse de basse-mer,
malgre toute defense de 1nine.
,
Evidemment les stipulations de l'article 5, alinea 2, sont prohibitives, et ceci etant tacitement admis, une disposition fut introduite
dans !'article 3, en VUe de permettre }'usage de Inines aillarreeS a dix
milles en avant des ports de guerre, Yraisemblablement deja fortement fortifies, disposition qui ne subit aucune restriction par le 2e
paragraphe de !'article 5, tanclis que, par contre, le 1neme droit est refuse
a des ports sans defense. Il est vrai que le 2e alinea de l'article 3
permet pratiquement de declarer tout port, port de guerre, mais le
droit legitime de defense ne devrait pas etre subordonne a !'interpretation d'une stipulation intentionnellement vague.
L'article 3 permet ala defense de placer des mines jusqu':\ la limite
de 10 milles devant tout port que l'on peut declarer port de guerre.
L'article 4, alinea 2, permet seulement a la force attaquante de placer
des mines en dehors de la limite de trois nlilles a partir de la laisse de
basse-mer de la cote de son adversaire, quand les etablissements de
construction de navires ou autres sont la propriete de l'Etat; inegalite
qui a ete proposee ala session de l'Institut de Droit International et
rejetee, ainsi que cela est signale dans le rapport tres competent actuellement soumis ala commission.
Les articles 2 et 3 ne sont pas acceptes par la Delegation des EtatsUnis. Ils portent une atteinte serieuse aux droits existants et necessaires a la defense; ils sont Yagues et complexes au point de constituer
une menace de serieux malentendus s'ils etaient acceptes.
Les l er et 2e alineas de I' article. 4 ne sont pas acceptes par nous
en raison de l'inegalite de leurs dispositions et aussi de !'incertitude
de leur application. (Ibid., p. 386.)

.A. dn1iral Sperry, also of the An1erican delegation, had
said in the co1nite d'exa.n1en:
L'omission, dans la proposition de la Delegation des Etats-Unis
d' Amerique relativement aux mines sous-marines, d'une limitation
definie des emplacements dans lesquels elles peuvent ctre placees,
n'est pas due a une sympathie quelconque pour l'usage general
des mines au-dela des eaux territoriales, methode que, en commun
avec tout le monde civilise, elle condamne, mais bien a d'autres considerations (annexe 17).
Le terme "eaux territoriales" n' est peut-etre pas plus certain dans
son application que les limites mesurees; mais le delegue naval des
Etats-Unis n'est pas prepare a dire qu'une limitation d 'une maniere
ou d'une autre ne porterait pas atteinte au droit de defendre les 4,000
milles de la cote continentale des Etats-Unis, a certains points qui
doivent etre approches par un chenal tortueux entre des recifs submerges, loin du rivage, oil quelques 1nines empecheraient absolument
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rl'a\·oir acces. Dans une ile, enYironnee de nkifs, des Philippines, il
y a une grande baie entouree de tous cotes par la terre , qui abriterait
la flotte de la plus grande Puissance.
Les Puissances, qui sont representees ici, ont de vaates et riehes
possessions dans l'Ocean Pacifique et l'Ocean Indien, ou les ports et
les iles sont abrites par des barrierres de recifs de corail, avec seulement
ici et la un passage qui peut etre ou non en dec;a de dix, ou en de~a
de cent milles de la terre ferme.
Les recifs peuYent etre decouYerts ou non a man~e basse. Ou est
la limite de la man~e basse? A-t-il ete decide que toutes les eaux endedans de recifs sont des eaux territoriales? Les trois milles seront-ils
mesures des recifs et au-dela? La cote (Lasteric) d' Australie est
abritee pendant plus de mille milles par le Grand Bane de Recifs a
une distance de vingt a cent cinquante milles du riYage. En dedans
de ce recif, ou il n'y a que de loin en loin des passages, il existe un
labyrinthe de recifs moindres et d'llots, mais dans les mille milles les
plus gros vaisseaux peuvent naviguer en surete SOliS la charge d'un
pilote. II n'est pas necessaire pour un navire n'allant pas a un port
australien de passer en dedans, et les eaux interieures ne peuvent
guere etre consiclerees comme faisant partie de Ia haute mer. II n'est
pas a la connaissance du Delegue des Etats-Unis si elles sont considerees ainsi; mais il semble douteux que les nationaux de cette
grande et riche communaute abandonnent volontiers ce qui serait
presqu'une defense parfaite des points importants.
II y a beaucoup de Puissances representees ici, dont les cotes de
leurs vastes empires coloniaux sont protegees par des rem parts presque
parfaits de corail, comme tous les officiers de marine le saYent, et il
serait bon de considerer avec soin les effets qui pourraient resulter de
toute proYision conventionnelle, sur laquelle nous pourrions nous
mettre d'accord, et qui une fois faite, sera difficile a denoncer. (Ibid.,
p. 408.)

When the article3 of the proposed convention relating
to areas in \vhich n1ine.~ might be placecl 'vere brought
before the full committee, opinion 'vas not sufficiently
favor~ble to 'varrant presenting articles 2-5 of the report
of the comite d'exa.n1en to the full conference. The
suppre3sion of these articles necessarily led to certain
an1endnlents in articles 'vhich "rere related.
The suppres;;ion of reference to the limitation of area
'\Tithin 'vhich mines might be used 'vas not regarded as
giving an unlin1ited right to belligerent or to neutral to
use 1nines inrliscriminately in any area. It \vaa recognized that n very heavy responsibility restednpon the one
'vho placed a mine to see that. it did not injure neutrals.
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The area of the use of mines \Vas hroadly left to '' t,he
conscience, the good sense: and the consciousness of
the oblig~1tions irnposed by the principles of huntanity.·''
(Ibid., Ton1e I, p. 2S9.)
Conclusion.-Fron1 the discussion there \vas evident
'videly divergent opinion as to the proper regulations jn
regard to area. Front the votes there 'vas no decisive
conclusion. \r-hae 1uuch can be left to the sense of international obligution, it w·ould seem tha.t certain general rules
might be estu blished without unduly impairing the rights
of innocent parties \Yhile securing reasonable freerlorn of
action for belligereu ts.
Removal o..f mi-nes.-As belligerents may not only place
mines within their o'vn 'vaters and on the high seas, but
also 'vithin the 'vaters of one another under present regulations, it is necessary that some provision be n1ade for
the ren1oval of the mines at the close of the 'va.r. N aturally also a state 'vould not desire that a foreign vessel
should enter its 'vaters for the purpose of ren1oving mines
even in tirne of peace. Of course, there n1ay be, as the
delegate of the United States pointed out, con1plications
and difficulties in the removal of mines. Though the
part~y 'vho placed the mines is under obligation to notify
the other of the situation of the mines, the difficulties of
exact statement of these facts n1ay be great, mines may
have drifted, or n1ay have broken loose so that it is
impossible to give accurate information. The placing of
mines off an enemy coast 'vould usually be undertaken at
considerable risk, 'vould usually be hastily performed,
and accurate locations 'vould be correspondingly lacking.
The mines laid by a state within its o'vn 'vaters 'vould
naturally be ren1oved by that state, but it may be 'veil
for the safety of navigation in general. that this_ removal
be made obligatory.
The mines laid in the high seas, if this practice is
allowed, might constitute the greatest danger. The
difficulty in picking up these mines would be great.
Article 5 of the Hague convention relative to the laying of automatic contact submarine mines seems to be
generally approved, though it may be questioned 'vhethPr
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it will accomplish in fact "\vhat is hoped.
as foUo,vs:
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At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do
their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each power
removing its own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the
belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to
the other party by the power which laid them, and each power must
proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own
waters.

Precautions as to anchored mines.-The Naval War
College discussion in 1905 and the discussion at The
Hague in 1907 as well as the discussion of the Institute
of International I_jaw through several years, show agreement upon the point that anchored contact mines should
be so constructed as to become harmless "\Vhen breaking
adrift.
Article 3 of The Hague Convention of 1907 is:
\Vhen anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these
mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and, should they
cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as
military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also
be communicated to the Government through the diplomatic channel

Manifestly this article is very general in its terms
Such terms as "every .possible precaution" seem to
guarantee ample care for the peaceful shipping.
The next clause provides that the mines "shall become
harmless within a limited time," but no limit is named.
The limit may, therefore, be hours, days, weeks, months,
or perhaps years. The notice of mines not under surveillance must be given "as soon as military exigencies
permit." The belligerent must, of course, be the judge
in most cases of "military exigencies."
As Capt. Behr of the Russian delegation said, uncontrolled mines should in principle become harmless as
soon as possible. "La diffi.cul te ne commence que
lorsqu'on veut realiser ce principe." It is necessary to
consider the technique of mine construction and the
possibility of meeting the proposed requirements. Capt.
Behr further maintained that a satisfactory solution
71396-15- - 9*
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'vould require tin1e and cxperin1ent, but some regulation
'vould then be valuable in calling attention to the n1atter
of the necessity of further regulation at a ln.ter date.
The discussion at The Hague in 1907 is sum1narized in
the report as follo,vs:
~Ialgre le caractere plus ou mains vague des -differentes obligations,
enoncees dans !'article 6, on a ete d'accord sur leur efficacitc, attendu
que tout etat se fera certes un devoir de les observer rigoureusement,
en procedant notamment le plus tOt possible aux notifications deeretees, des que les exigences militaires lui permettront dele faire. Quant
aux conditions de construction, dont parle l'alinen 2 de !'article et "au
laps de temps limite" qui y est prevu, tout en f·tant unanime, que la
fixation de ce delai appartient a l'etat, qui a pose des mines amarrees,
afin que ces mines ne continuent pas a etre dangereuses longtemps
apres la fin des hostilites, on a longuement discute la possibilite, au
point de vue technique, de suffire a ce::J obligations. Le Capitaine de
Vaisseau Ottley rappela a ce propos "que les lois de 1' action electrogalvanique entre deux metaux dissemblables, en immersion, pretent
un moyen facile et non couteux de changer·meme les coques des mines
existantes, afin d.e satisfaire ala condition de !'article 6; il suffirait de
percer un trou d'une grandeur de quelques centimetres dans la coque
d'une mine et de fermer le trou par Ull bouchon en metal, tel que le
zinc; en variant le caractere metallique du disque et en modifiant son
epaisseur, on pourra regler plus ou mains la periode, pendant laquelle
la mine restera flottante et active; plus le disque sera mince, plus la
vie active de la mine sera courte."
Ces constatations, presentees par la Delegation britannique dans une
des dernieres seances du comite, ne rencontrerent pas d'objections de
la part des autres delegues techniques presents; neanmoins, on ne crut
pas pouvoir accepter la proposition, renouvelce par la Delegation
britannique, de supprimer les mots "dans la mesure du possible" qui
avaient ete adoptes auparavant. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 418.)

There are some 'vho maintain that the anchored contact mine may be and is more dangerous than the unanchored contact 1nine, saying:
The unrestricted use of anchored contact mines in open shallow seas
will prove such a menace to all vessels which traverse such waters,
that their entire prohibition seems imperative for the safety of neutrals.
Free distribution of anchored contact mines will deny navigation of
such waters to all commerce during the period of hostilities and for an
unlimited time after hostilities have ceased. The very fact that such
mines will have to be laid in open shallow waters under cover of darkness or fog precludes accurate location of them, precludes accurate
information of such mine ,dangers to innocent commercial vessels, and
precludes removal of all such mines at the close of the war. Inaccurately located mine fields present a greater danger to shipping than a
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poorly charted reef, because a mine field laid quickly at night some
distance from fixed observation marks would be a worse menace to
navigation than a reef surveyed under similar adverse conditions.
The loose uncontrolled buoyant contact mine is a terrible menace to
human life and to neutral commerce-and such drifting buoyant mines
will remain a danger to shipping throughout vast areas of the sea for a
long time after peace hag been declared.
Unanchored contact mines ("floating" mines) being of a buoyant
type can be designed with a positive limitation of operative life
that is, they can be made to become harmless by sinking after being
in the water for a fixed period of time. Thus the "floating" or unanchored contact mine would not be a lasting menace to neutral shipping as would be the case with drifting mines of the anchored contact
type. Nor would floating mines present as much danger to neutrals as
securely anchored contact mines, for the reason that the former (owing
to their limited operative life) would be laid in the immediate area of
hostilities, which in itself would be sufficient warning of danger to
neutral vessels, while on the other hand the hidden anchored mine
fields might be laid anywhere on soundings, be very poorly charted,
and probably without timely warning to neutrals. It would not be
difficult to warn neutral vessels away from areas where "two-hour"
floating mines have been strewn, but would a belligerent divulge to
neutrals the location of fixed mined areas and thus run the risk of this
information finding its way to the enemy?

While the above position sedms extrema to some, it is
nevertheless necessary to observe the fact that during the
Russo-Japanese 'var, the drifting mines caused great
damage even in a maritime area 'vhere there 'vas comparatively little shipping. If a like situation should arise
in the vicinity of a great sea route, the results are serious
to contemplate. Whatever the vie'v in regard to the
matter of anehored co~tact mines if they are not to be
entirely prohibited, the regulations as to their use should
be clear and comprehensive.
There are conditions for which it seen1s difficult to provide adequate safeguards. Such 'vould be the case 'vhen
a vessel, approaehes a mined area in a fog. The vessel on
guard to 'varn innocent vessels n1ay not discover the
approaching vessel or n1ay be in doubt as to its identity.
The same condition may arise in a storm or in darkness.
The notification by public announce1nent of the general
area of mining operations may be of little service to the
neutral or innocent vessel unless it is of a nature to give
such information to the opposing belligerent as to make
the mining operations of little use to the belligerent plac-
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ing the mines. For if sufficiently definite information for
safe na"Vigation is given in the notification this information 'viii equally serve the other belligerent. It 'vould
seem therefore that the notification 'vould necessarily be
such as to define in general terms the mined area, the
conditions of entrance, etc., and until this information
can be presumed to be kno,vn to innocent shipping there
should be a vessel or vessels stationed in the neighborhood to warn approaching shipping.
- From the discussion it is evident that the regulations
in regard to precautions for the safety of peaceful shipping should be more specific in order that the innocent
shipping may be properly protected and in order that the
belligerent may kno'v when he has conformed to requirements.
Conclu.sion.-The follo,ving regulation may be proposed
for safeguarding peaceful shipping against the dangers of
mined areas :
VVhen anchored automatic contact mines are employed
every possible precaution must be taken for the security
of peaceful shipping including1. An advance not~ce to foreign governments and to
mariners specifying the general limits of the mined area.
2. Provision for 'varning peaceful vessels approaching
the n1ined area.
3. Specification of the time during 'vhich the mines
'viii be dangerous.
The same precautions should be taken in the use of
mines by neutrals.
Use of mines by neutrals .-The demand for the use of
mines by neutrals was particularly emphasized by the
Brazilian and by the :K ether lands delegates at The Hague
in 1907. 'rhe Brazilian delegate advocated the use of
mines by neutrals for the guaranteeing of respect for
their neutrality. The X ethcrlands delegate directed
attention not 111erely to the preservation of neutrality,
but also to the fulfillment of neutral obligations. The
report contains a resume of the points of vie'v:
L'idee fondamentale contenue dans ces deux propositions etait la
meme; la proposition bresilienne linlitait seulement davantage, quant
a leur espece, les mines que les neutres pourraient employer.
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S . Exc . le Yice-Amiral Roell attira }'attention de la sous-commission
sur la necessite de reglementer cette matiere et cela a Ull double point
de vue; d'un cote, pour reconnaitre expressement la faculte des neutres
de poser des mines, en vue de preserver leur neutralite, tout en leur
permettant en me me temps de se conformer aux devoirs, qui leur incombent vis-a-vis des deux belligerants, de }'autre cote pour leur
imposer, quant a }'usage des mines, les memes obligations qui seraient
imposees aux belligerants, dans l'interet de la navigation pacifique.
Le Capitaine de Fregate Burlamaqui expliqua a son tour la necessite
de completer dans ce sens le projet britannique, qui ne paraissait avoir
en vue que les belligerants; il insista, en meme temps, sur la necessite
d'une notification par les neutres, generale ou speciale, selon les circonstances du moment, des regions dans lesquelles ils auraient place
des mines. II invoqua, a l'appui de ces considerations, les decisions
prises par l'Institut de Droit International dans la session de Gand et
les opinions de plusieurs auteurs, connus en matiere du droit des gens;
il conc]ut en faveur de la faculte, pour les Etats neutres, de poser des
mines en vue de leur droit primordial de conservation. (Deuxieme
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 419.)

Discussion on other important points is summarized in
the report:
.Jiais on se demanda, si !'assimilation des neutres aux belligerants
devait aussi s'etendre quant aux lieux ou des mines sous-marines
pourraient etre mouillees et si les precautions a prendre par les neu tres
ne devaient pas etre plus precises et plus rigoureuses que celles
prevues pour les belligerants. Le Contre-Amiral Arago exposa que,
quant a ce qui concerne les neutres, il faudrait se contenter de leur
permettre la pose de mines seulement dans la zone de trois milles; il
serait encore necessaire de les obliger a donner avis prealable .a la
navigation des lieux, ou ils voudraient poser des mines, et de notifier
cet avis d'urgence aux autres Gouvernements; les raisons militaires,
dit-il, qui donnent plus de latitude aux belligerants, ne peuvent pas
etre invoquees pour les neutres; la zone de dix milles a ete accordee
aux belligerants surtout en vue du danger de voir leurs ports bombardes par les forces navales ennemies; ce danger n'existe pas pour
les neutres. La latitude accordee aux belligerants, quanta la notification, repond a des exigences de guerre imperieuses; le neutre ne se
trouve pas dans pareille situation; il peut toujours notifier et il doit
le faire d'avance, parce que ses eaux sont censees etre ouvertes au libre
passage des navires pacifiques.
Aux objections, tirees du droit des neutres de se defendre dans la
meme mesure que les belligerants et de la possibilite qui devrait etre
accordee aux neutres en vue de se preparer eventuellement ala guerre,
il fut repondu que les neutres n'ont pas a se defendre, ils n'ont qu'a
defendre leur neutralite, ce qui n'implique pas une egalite de droits
avec les belligerants. Quant aux preparatifs pour une guerre cventuelle il serait evident que ces preparatifs ne sont pas vises par les
dispositions restreignant les neutres a poser des mines dans une zone
de trois milles. (Ibid, p. 420.)
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The result of the vote sho,ved practically no difference
of opinion upon the main points, and the conference
adopted a general regulation embodied in article 4:
Any neutral power which lays automatic contact mines off its coasts
must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are
imposed on belligerents. The neutral power must inform mariners by
a notice issued in advance where automatic contact mines will be laid.
This notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through
the diplomatic channel.

Conclusion.-The laying of 1nines by a neutral State
should not be prohibited.
Provision for exe-1nption from rules as to mines.-While
the rules of the IIague convention relative to the laying of
automatic contact subn1arine mines 'vere not very strict,
there 'vere son1e States 'vhose delegates were not prepared
to accept even these regulations. To meet the demands
of these States, article 6 'vas adopted:
The contracting powers which _do not at present own perfected mines
of the type contemplated in the present convention, and which consequently could not at present carry out the rules laid down in articles
1 and 3, undertake to convert the materiel of their mines as soon as
possible, so as to bring it into conformity with the foregoing requirements.

The staten1ent of the position in support of this article 'vas more fully made by the Austrian delegation 1n
presenting the amendment upon 'vhich the article rs
based:
La marine austro-hongroise ne dispose pas, a l'heure qu'il est, de
mines automatiques de contact amarrees remplissant la condition
prevue par !'article 1er, 2e alinea, du texte arrete sur la base des
deliberations du comite d'examen, a savoir de devenir inoffensives
des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres. Pour se conformer a la
clause dont il s'agit, la marine austro-hongroise se trouve done dans
la necessite de proceder a une transformation de son materiel de mines.
Pour cette transformation la Delegation d 'Au triche-Hongrie ne saurait,
cependant, accepter ni le delai de trois ans propose, ni tout autre
delai fixe a l'avance, une mesure de ce genre contenant, independamment de la volonte personnelle, un element d'incertitude qui, tant
qu'il subsiste, s'oppose evidemment a prendre a ce sujet un engagement formel que l'on ne serait, peut-etre, pas a meme de remplir.
Dans tout prefectionnement en matiere technique, l'epoque ou l'on
parviendra a trouver une solution satisfaisante a un probleme que l'on
se propose de resoudre ne saurait guere etre indiquee al'avance. 1Ieme
si le principe scientifique sur lequel repose !'invention a faire etait,
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au point de vue theorique, des plus simples, des obstacles absolument
imprevus et qu'il est bien souvent difficile de vaincre peuvent, a tout
bout de champ, venir en traver la realisation pratique de I 'idee.
Aussi ne faut-il pas perdre de vue que dans le cas qui nous occupe, il
ne serait point suffisant de construire un appareil de fonctionnement
exact, au moyen duquel une mine ayant rompu son amarre flit automatiquement rendue inoffensive; il s'agit egalement, et ceci ne me
semble pas de moindre importance, de donner a l'appareil en question
une construction telle que les autres parties mecaniques de la mine
n'en soient point alterees au prejudice de sa valeur militaire, que
la mine reste simple et non dangereuse a manier et qu'elle ne cesse
de fonctionner d'une maniere slire et efficace. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir
eprouve, a ces differents points de vue, l'appareil a construire, ce qui
selon toute probabilite necessitera une serie de longues experiences,
que l'on pourra se mettre a la transformation du materiel de mines et
indiquer alors approximativement l'epoque a laquelle cette op~ration
pourra etre terminee.
Or, si, telles que les choses se presentent, nous voulions fixer, des
maintenant, par voie conventionnelle, un terme pour la mise en usage
des mines perfectionnees, et si a I' expiration du delai la transformation
en question n' etait pas encore executee par une des Puissances contractantes, cette derniere se trouverait en presence d'une situation des
plus embarrassantes. Car elle devrait, si une guerre venait a eclater
dans l'intervalle, ou renoncer a l'emploi des mines qui n'ont pas encore
ete soumises ala transformation, ou bien manquer a !'engagement conventionnel. L'une et l'autre de ces eventualites doivent necessairement etre ecartees. II nous semble done que si l'on prend au serieux
!'engagement qu'il s'agit de contracter, on ne saurait accepter, dans
l'espece, un delai fixe a l'avance.
Dans cet ordre d 'idees la Delegation d 'Autriche-Hongrie se permet
de proposer les a1nendements suivants:
Article premier.-Ajouter a l'alinea 2 la disposition suivante:
Les Puissances maritimes qui ne disposent pas encore de ces mines
perfectiunnees et qui, par consequent, ne sauraient actuellement
s'associer a cette interdiction, s'engager'it a transformer, aussitot que
possible, leur materiel de lllines a:fin que ces dernieres repondent a la
r
COndition SUSinentionnee.
ARTICLE D.-Supprimer cet article.
Le fait que la transformation des mines s'i1npose non seule1nent par
des considerations humanitaires, mais aussi par !'interet n1eme des
Puissances, offre une garantie suffisante que I' engagement formule dans
la proposition ci-dessus soit fidelement execute. De cette fa~on le but
humanitaire auquel on aspire sera realise des qu'il y aura moyen de le
faire. Agir autrement et accepter de& maintenant ur Jelai determine
pour la transformation des n1ines, ce serait, de l'avis.de la Delegation
d' Autriche-Hongrie, prendre un engagement avec une restriction
mentale, ce qui evidemment ne serait guere en harmonie aYec !'obligation absolue decoulant d'une stipulation conventionnelle.
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Quant aux mines non-amarrees dont il est question au premier alinea
de I' article 1er de la Delegation d 'Autriche-Hongrie, s'assoclant entierement aux observations presentees a ce sujet par le Delegue naval de
Grande-Bretagne, estin1e que l'on pourrait bien se passer d'une disposition analogue a celle dont il vient d'etre parle ou de toute autre disposition contena ut la fixation d' un terme.
En ce qui concerne la disposition _de 2e alinea de !'article 5, la
Delegation d' Autriche-Hongrie s'abstient de toute proposition, Ia
clause en question lui paraissant, en principe, inacceptable. (Ibid.,
p. 673.)

There "·ere propositioes to fi.x a limit of time for trar~s
forination of mines not meeting the requirements of the
proposed regula tior s ns one year for unanchored mines
and three years for anchored n1ines or one year for all
mines.
It is plain that as most po"·ers did not disclose the type
of mines "·hich they possessed almost any po,Yer might
contend thQ. t it had not had time for conversion of its
mines. The expression, "as soon as possir le," ,,·hich
should determir:e the limit of the period for conversion to
the prescribed type might allo\Y, as some pnrties nssumed
it "'"ould, an indefinite period. In fact this clause in most
respects renders the convention of little use except as a
statement of w·hat may be desired and as a project "Thich
may become the basis of further discussion. Ho,,·ever,
there ,,·ould ce a just ground for maintaining that seven
years would be sufficient time for any State intending to
act "as soon as possible" to carry out the conversion of
mines into the type required in the convention.
Oonclu.sion.-.A.rticle 6 of Convention \TIII should not
be continued in force.
Use of torpedoes .-The Russian delegation proposed an
amendment to the original project submitted by Great
Britain to the effect thatLes torpilles seront construites de fa~on ace que, en tant que cela est
possible, elles deviennent inoffensives, lorsqu'elles auront manque
leur but.

The 'vords "en tant que cela est possible" "·ere not
acceptable, lut the idea embodied in the remaining part
of the clause \vas introduced "'"ith little discussion into

GENERAL CONCLUSION.

the first article of the convention.
committee says of this subject:
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Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrces et aux torpilles
automatiques, I' entente fut, en ce qui concerne leur construction, plus
facile a etablir. La proposition russe sur les torpilles autornatiques
(annexe 18) fut adoptee a l'unanimite avec suppression des mots
"autant que possible" qui figuraient dans !'interdiction proposee par
la Delegation Imperiale, concernant l'emploi de pareilles torpilles, qui
ne deviennent pas inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but."
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 404.)

Recently there has teen objection to the restriction
imposed upon the use of torpedoes. Some regard these
as propelle~ mines and under a measure of control, because their speed, direction, and time of sinking may te
regulated 'vith much greater degree of certainty than in
the case of unanchored mines. Unanehored mines are
usually of simple and inexpensive co11struction as compared 'vith the elaborate and expeLsive torpedo. Unanchored mines are much more at the mercy of the current and may drift in any direction. The torpedo may
be directed for a cor siderable time and its mechanical
corstruction is such that it can te made to sink at a fixed
time 'vith a great degree of certainty that there 'vill 1= e no
mistake. The proposition has accordingly ceen made to
allo'v to the torpedo a period equivalent to that allo"~ed
to the u~lanchored mine on the following grounds: that
from its nature the torpedo is more under control than
the unanchored mine, that the present regulation is not a
practicable one as there is no "~ay by 'vhich the belligerent
at 'vhich the torpedo is aimed can tell 'vhether the torpedo
has failed to hit its mark in most irstar..ces, and that it is
inexpedient to discriminate in favor of the cheap and
dangerous unanchored mine against the carefully constructed and controlled torpedo.
Oonclusion.-The use of torpedoes should not be further,
but should ce less, regulated if any change is made in the
convention.
General.-The Hague Convention VIII, 1907, relative
to the laying of automatic contact submarine mines 'vas
admitted to be tentative. There 'vas much difference of
opinion in the conference 'vhich adopted the convention.
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The interests of the po"~ers "~ere not identical. The
ac~ual value of 1nines in n1aritin1e "~arfa.re "'"as a. 1natter
of difference of opinion. The coupling of the idea of
su bn1arine mine "-ith the idea of the torpedo ".,.as not altogether logic~} ".,.ithout further distinction, as torpedoes
'vould in general be n1ore con1pletely under control than
"-ould son1e forn1s of 1nines. Uncontrolled and hidden
perils like unanchored su b1narine 1nines or torpedoes of
sin1ilar character should be prohibited outside the area of
inunediate belligerent operations. At present it seen1s
possible to dra"~ certain conclusions of a general character.
Concl-usion.-( a) The use of su bn1arine 1nines should
not be absolutely prohibited.
(b) The use of unanchored automatic contact n1ines
should be prohibited or n1ore definitely restricted. 1
(c) The area "'"ithin 'vhich 1nines 1nay be placed should
be deter1nined by regulation.
·
(d) \Yhen anchored auto1natic contact 111ines are enlployed, eYery possible precaution 1nust be taken for the
security of peaceful shipping, including1. An adYance notice to foreign goYerninents and to
n1ariners specifying the generalli1nits of the n1ined area.
2. ProYision for ".,.arning peaceful vessels approaching
the 1nined area.
3. Specification of the ti1ne during ".,.hich the n1ines
'vill be dangerous.
(e) The laying of mines by a neutral State should not
be prohibited.
(f) Article 6 of ConYention ·viii should not be continued in force.
(g) The use of torpedoes should not be further but
should be less regulated if any change is 1nade in the
conYention.
t Using the phraseology of 'I'he Hague Convention and 'introducing the nroposed
changes, the following form may be suggested as meeting present requirements and
opinions: It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatir contact mines except when they
are so constructed as to become harmless one-half hour after those who laid them have
lost control over them, and in every case before passing outside the area of belligeren
activities.

